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Abstract 
This article examines foreign fighter movements, in particular, those who joined the 
Islamic State and al-Nusra front from Southeast Asia to Syria and Iraq. It will 
analyze the dynamics of the movements in Southeast Asia and Syria and Iraq, 
provide a discussion of the potential threats of the returnees and how state and civil 
society respond to the threats of the groups. It is based on interviews with Afghan 
veterans in Indonesia and analyses of primary and secondary sources of the Syrian 
and Iraq conflicts. It argues that it be urgent to strengthen unity and partnership 
between the state and civil society in coping the rise of the terrorist movements and 
to prevent violent attacks after the returns of Southeast Asian fighters from Syria 
and Iraq.  
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Introduction 
 The term ‘foreign fighters’ in this 
article refers to fighters who involved 
insurgencies outside their countries. It 
covers not only the people who join in 
combat but also those who migrate and 
travel to the conflict zone to participate in 
fighting or training with an insurgent 
group or provide some supports (Zammit 
2015). In 1980s-1990s, people traveled 
from Southeast Asia and other countries 
to join Mujahidin in Afghanistan to fight 
against the Soviet Union. They are 
considered as foreign fighters. It includes 
the people travel from all over the world 
to Syria and Iraq to fight against Bashar 
al-Asad’s regime in the last decade.  
  
 This article will examine 
transnational terrorist movements, in 
particular, the Islamic State (IS) and 
Jabhat al Nusra (JN), which impact to the 
rise of terrorism recruitment, 
transnational movements, and national-
international threats. Their involvement in 
the Syrian conflict combines violent 
experience, international terrorism 
networks, and direct threats from 
returnees to their home countries. The 
number of foreign fighters in Syria and 
Iraq is varied from around 20,000 to 
70,000 fighters from about 100 
nationalities, including 4000 fighters from 
Western Europe (Lister 2015). The fighters 
from Southeast Asia, especially from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand 
and the Philippines are main concerns on 
this article, how the fighters moved to 
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Syria and Iraq and how state and civil 
society in Southeast Asia anticipate the 
returnees of the fighters. Katibah 
Nusantara, the group, founded by fighters 
from Southeast Asia in Syria and Iraq 
united fighters from Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines 
with Indonesians took leadership 
positions. Overall Southeast Asian 
fighters are around a thousand and 
Indonesia dominated the number and 
leadership. Indonesia contributes about 
500 to 700 fighters from both the Islamic 
State and Jabhat al-Nusra, which created 
frictions among Jihadists in Indonesia and 
Southeast Asia. Many of them previously 
became a strong part of Jama’ah Islamiyah 
leadership and members, however after 
the foundation of IS by Southeast Asian 
jihadists the frictions begin.  
 Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who used to 
be chairman of Jama’ah Islamiyah after 
the death of Abdullah Sungkar, now takes 
a crucial position in the IS of Indonesia 
along with Aman Abdurrahman. 
Advisory board leadership of Ba’asyir and 
Aman is very influential to the growth of 
IS in Indonesia from about 500 in 2014 to 
1,500 in 2015. Bahrumsyah and M. Fachry 
declared IS in Indonesia in July 2014. 
Although the early meetings are 
discussing the support of Islamic State of 
Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) held in Tangerang 
in February 2014.  
 This article is based on the 
interviews with former foreign fighters 
involved in the Afghan war in the 1980s. 
Among them joined violent attacks in Bali 
and Jakarta. Furthermore, it analyses 
primary and secondary sources from 
foreign fighter group websites, 
government and research center policy 
papers. It argues that mobilization and 
movements of foreign fighters have 
attracted more recruits and strengthened 
the capacity of individuals and groups 
after their involvements of fighting in 
Syria and Iraq. The returnees of Syria and 
Iraq potentially threatens security and 
stability in Southeast Asia and 
international regions where foreign 
fighters back to their home countries. 
Foreign Fighters 
 Up to a thousand of Southeast 
Asian jihadists are among foreign fighters 
from all over the world. It is surprisingly 
the percentage of foreign fighters from the 
West is much higher than the participants 
of fighters in the history of conflict and 
war involving jihadists such as Afghan 
war. Compared to Afghan fighters, IS 
(used to be ISIS) is ‚much better 
organized in that it has a military 
approach in spreading its influence with 
an over-arching set of strategies and a 
strong centralized leadership. Al-Qaida 
has more of the attack-and-run style, and 
the groups affiliated with it seem to be 
operating relatively independent‛ 
(Nadaraj 2014). The majority of recruits to 
the Islamic State going to Syria intended 
of ‚acting there rather than training to 
become domestic terrorists‛ and ‚remains 
more personal than political‛ (The Soufan 
Group 2015: 7). However, the latest two 
decades domestic attack plots were 
organized by individual and groups 
closely related to foreign fighters 
experience.  Bali bombings in 2002 
involved Afghan veterans affiliated to 
Jama’ah Islamiyah. Afghan returnees 
endangered their home countries 
threatening terror attacks and violent 
attack plans in the US, France, Australia, 
Southeast Asia, Europe, North Africa and 
the Middle East. Syrian and Iraq conflicts 
returnees will endanger and threaten 
more to their home countries.  
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David Malet defined foreign 
fighters as ‚non-citizens of conflict states 
who join insurgencies during civil 
conflicts,‛ playing critical roles in conflicts 
since ancient periods (Lister 2015). The 
nearest equivalent was fighting in 
Afghanistan against the Soviet Union, 
which attracted about 20,000 foreign 
fighters over a twelve years from 1980 to 
1992. Charles Lister (2015) estimated 
foreign fighters involved in Syria and Iraq 
was growing dramatically from 700-1,400 
in mid-2012 to over 22,000 in early 2015.  
 It is predicted that the number of 
foreign fighters: Tunisia (3,000), Saudi 
Arabia (2,500), Morocco (2,000), Jordan 
(1,500), France (1,550), Russia (1,500), 
Turkey (1,300), UK (700) – unnamed 
intelligence officials said 1,600, Germany 
(700), Indonesia (700), Libya (600), Bosnia 
(340), China (300), US (200), Malaysia 
(100), the Philippines (100) and Singapore 
(2) (Lister 2015: 1). The number of fighters 
is underestimated by analysts and 
intelligent. Indonesian intelligent 
authority argued that Indonesian fighters 
join the Islamic State and al-Nusra Front 
are about 200-300. They do not consider 
the number of Indonesian fighters from 
the Middle East, Pakistan and North 
Africa where they are studying. Wildan 
Mukhollad (19), an Indonesian student at 
Al-Azhar University and Al Islam school 
graduate, joined IS in 2012 and became a 
suicide bomber for IS in Iraq in early 2014 
(Nuraniyah 2015). Mukhollad wanted to 
show himself that he is among the best 
young fighters continued the agenda of 
Bali trio and senior fighters in the early 
period of the Al Islam school of East Java. 
He is among three martyrs in Syria and 
Iraq graduated from the school. IPAC 
(2014) also stated other martyr Zainul 
Arifin recruited by the school graduate for 
IS bombing attack operation in Poso 
targeting Police.
 
 
Table 1. Foreign fighters in Syria and 
Iraq
 
Sources :Lister 2015; The Soufan Group 2015 
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Lessons from Southeast Asia 
 It is interesting to learn how 
Southeast Asian fighter organization 
founded and grew in Syria and Iraq, poses 
direct threats to government and the 
people in the region, and how state and 
civil society responded to the rise of 
radical jihadists and foreign fighters from 
Southeast Asian regions. Their number, 
growth, and capacity are more efficient 
and deadly that fighters of the Afghan war 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 Southeast Asian fighters are 
divided at least into two factions: Daesh 
(the Islamic State) and al-Nusra front (JN). 
The tensions between ISIS and al-Nusra in 
late 2013 have forced Southeast Asian 
jihadists to choose their sides. In Indonesia, 
Aman Abdurrahman sided with ISIS. The 
website almustaqbal.net, edited by M. 
Fachry, also supported ISIS. On the other 
hand, al-Nusra front had its supporters, 
commonly senior JI leaders and associates 
of al-Qaidah. Arrahmah.com, among the 
supporters, published statements from 
ISIS critics like al-Maqdisi and Aiman 
Zawahiri. It published Abu Khalid as-Suri, 
Zawahiri’s associate, claimed ISIS of 
undermining Jihad movement (IPAC 
2014).  Ali Imron and other Afghan 
veterans criticized that the Islamic State do 
not conduct the ethics of Jihad like how 
the Prophet and his companions required 
rules and procedures of war. Imron 
considered the way of IS showing 
provocative video and pictures of 
slaughtering and other executions to 
public space is against the essence of Jihad 
to disseminate good conduct and Islamic 
ethics for a better community and the 
world.1 Furthermore, Abdul Qohar, Suhail 
and Masykur, other Afghan veterans 
                                                          
1 Ali Imron, interviews with author, Polda 
metro prison Jakarta, November 9, 2015.  
argued that the Islamic State recruitments 
to any people without enough training 
preparations impact lower capacity and 
immature Jihad operations. It will 
endanger their plan and counter-
productive to the mission of Jihad.2 Kohar 
joined Afghan academy training for three 
years and now keep himself into 
community education in Jakarta.  
 Southeast Asian IS fighters from 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore 
and the Philippines agreed to coordinate 
under the group of the Katibah Nusantara 
Lid Daulah Islamiyah or the Malay 
Archipelago Unit for the Islamic State in 
which fighters share a common culture 
and language of Bahasa Indonesia and 
Malay, and unite to recruit, train and 
mobilize fighters from Southeast Asia to 
Syria and Iraq. The Katibah Nusantara 
was headquartered in Al-Shadadi, in the 
Syrian province of Hasaka. It is headed by 
an Amir identified as Abu Ibrahim al-
Indunesiy. Leaders of the Katibah 
Nusantara are mostly Indonesians 
although some Malaysians appeared 
among the leadership. It has some 
departments: ‚combat fighters, snipers, 
heavy weapons, tactics and strategy, and 
military management‛ (Singh 2015: 2).  It 
has also volunteer positions for cyber 
propaganda and communications 
supported by IS members in Syria, 
Malaysia and Indonesia.  
Returnees: Threats and Challenge 
 ASEAN and international leaders 
warned the threats of returnees of Syrian 
and Iraq conflicts to stability and security. 
Their ideological and violent experience 
can influence people in the region. The 
returnees will strengthen the capacity of 
potential violent attacks in Southeast 
                                                          
2 Abdul Qohar, Suhail and Masykur, 
interviews with author, Jakarta, June 6, 2015.  
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Asian regions. It is based on the 
experiences of Afghan veterans who 
involved in serial attacks and plot plans 
targeting foreigners and government 
assets in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
the Philippines, and Thailand. Indonesia is 
the most severe region affected by violent 
attack operations by Afghan veterans.  
The IS returnees can be ‚mobilized to 
undertake attacks in Southeast Asia. 
Unlike JI which had members who were 
returnees from the Afghan war, this time, 
the region would be confronted with a far 
stronger force regarding numbers, 
ideology and military training and combat 
experience.‛ (Singh 2015: 1).  
 However, Institute for Policy and 
Analysis of Conflict have a different 
opinion to potential threats of returnees. 
IPAC (2014:11) stated that many Southeast 
Asian fighters are: 
 "Poorly educated, poorly vetted, poorly 
trained and poorly led. The result is the failure 
to do much damage. If the call to abandon the 
local effort and join the global jihad could 
weaken the movement still further, it is also 
true that mujahidin returning to Indonesia 
from Syria have the potential to provide 
everything today’s jihadist now lack - 
especially experienced leaders." 
 IPAC underestimates the capacity 
of foreign fighters, including those from 
Indonesia and Southeast Asia. Although 
they do not require military training from 
anybody joined Daesh/ IS, their fighting 
and engagement experience with 
international fighters in Syria and Iraq, 
sharing common interests against Asad’s 
regime and the West coalition countries 
are more than enough to consider the 
threats of the returnees. Ali Imron argues 
that ISIS more dangerous than Al Qaida. 
He said ‚we (Al Qaida) left the New 
Order Indonesia and never considered the 
government as unbeliever (Kafir). It is 
very different from ISIS which 
disseminates takfiri ideology.‛ This 
ideology makes IS members quickly 
targeting other people and groups for 
attack operations, including attacks on 
other Muslim fighters. In late 2013, IS 
killed leaders and individuals of JN, and 
other individuals and groups disagreed to 
support Al Baghdady.  
 As of February 2015, among 90 
Australian fighters have ‚appeared in 
propaganda videos for Jabhat al-Nusra 
and IS, three are believed to have carried 
out suicide bombings, and some 
Australians are occupying leadership 
positions. Some have also boasted of war 
crimes, and explicitly threatened 
Australia‛ (Zammit 2015: 10). The 
interactions and engagements experiences 
among foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq 
and their global networks enabled them to 
conduct transnational terrorism attacks. 
Kira's (2014: 364-365) argues that ‚the 
technologies associated with globalization 
have enabled terrorist cells and groups to 
mount coordinated attacks in different 
countries. Indeed, a hallmark of Islamic 
militant groups is their ability to conduct 
multiple attacks in different locations.‛ 
Cyber maniac among IS supporters in 
Indonesia had coordinated of robbery and 
attack operations in Medan and Poso in 
2014 and 2015 using online chats and 
emails (IPAC 2014). WhatsApp, 
Blackberry Messenger, and other social 
media have become favorite tools of 
interactions and coordination among the 
Islamic State members in the 
disseminating news, instruction, and 
meeting. They also used fundraising 
taking advantages of cyber technology.  
Coordinating of returnees of Southeast 
Asia and global IS, JN and other terrorist 
networks after the Syrian and Iraq conflict 
raised critical attentions among state 
leaders in Southeast Asia.  Lister stated 
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that ‚some returnees retain the potential 
for reintegration into Western society, 
with some requiring rehabilitation and 
psychological care. Above all, not every 
foreign fighter should necessarily be 
treated as a lifelong extremist, but instead 
as a potentially valuable member of his or 
her home society‛ (Lister 2015: 8).  
 Officials from Southeast Asian 
countries responded to the rise and threat 
of Southeast Asian fighters in Syria and 
Iraq. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore 
government authority concerned to the 
threats. They agreed to the importance of 
unity and comprehensive partnership 
between the state and civil society in 
coping with the Syrian and Iraq conflict 
returnees.  
 Singapore’s defense minister Ng 
Eng Hen argued that ‚the Islamic State 
poses a ‘clear and present danger’ to 
Southeast Asia, with trained foreign 
fighters returning from Syria and Iraq 
potentially linking up and formalizing ties 
with local groups to execute attacks‛ 
(Parameswaran 2015). Rebellious and 
violent jihadist groups such as Jama’ah 
Ansharut Tauhid commanded by Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir and Abu Sayyaf Group of 
Southern Philippines are among groups 
already pledged allegiance to the Islamic 
State since 2014. Former activists of 
Jama’ah Islamiyah have declared to 
support the caliphate of Abu Bakar Al-
Baghdady. To the Islamic State, Ng said 
that ‚they have sympathizers, they have 
foreign fighters who are trained, who have 
the motivation, the means and who have a 
common vision‛ (Parameswaran, 2015). In 
addition, Malaysian Defense Force Chief, 
General Tan Sri Zulkifli Mohd Zin was 
‚worried that when they (militants) return 
to Malaysia, they will do something that 
can threaten the safety of the country, 
especially after they established a network 
in neighbouring countries from Syria or 
Iraq‛ (Hanson 2015: 3).  The threats of IS 
to Southeast Asian countries also became a 
priority concern for Singapore’s Deputy 
Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean. He said 
that IS threats ‚not only to countries who 
are part of the US coalition but also to 
Singapore. As with the threat from the Al 
Qaeda, even if Singapore is not itself a 
target, foreign interest here may be 
targeted‛ (Hanson 2015: 3).  
 Civil society organizations are 
strategic groups protecting the community 
from radicalization and preventing 
recruitments of IS. In Indonesia, Nahdlatul 
Ulama and Muhammadiyah, the largest 
Muslim organizations are the backbone 
for Indonesian Muslims preserving 
religious moderation and committed to 
supporting nationalism and nation-state 
building. They are strategic partners for 
National Counter-Terrorism Agency 
(BNPT) to counter radicalism and 
terrorism.  
Conclusion 
 To conclude that mobilizations and 
movements of foreign fighters from 
Southeast Asia to Syria and Iraq conflicts 
raised the capacity of violent Jihadis 
groups in the region and internationalized 
them with global jihad networks in Syria 
and Iraq were up to 100 different 
nationalities of around 70,000 foreign 
fighters involved in different groups. 
Southeast Asian IS fighters coordinated 
quite effectively after the foundation of 
Katibah Nusantara which accommodates 
fighters from Southeast Asia. They 
successfully conducted operations in 2014 
attacking Kurds population. The 
foundation of the group was intended to 
accommodate Indonesian, and Malay 
speaking fighters and protected each other 
individuals and families from Bashar al-
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Assad and Western coalition’s attacks. 
They also successfully launched 
propaganda and recruited people from 
Southeast Asian countries. They have 
taken a strategic position to represent 
Caliphate leadership in Southeast Asia 
under Abu Bakar Al-Baghdady.    
 Syrian and Iraq conflict returnees 
threaten stability and security in their 
home countries. They strengthen the 
capacity of local groups and need to 
anticipate of potential threats to attack 
operations targeting government and 
foreigners as revenge for the defeat and 
the death of leaders and community of the 
Islamic State in Syria and Iraq conflicts 
and other regions. November 13, 2015, 
Paris attacks were a continuation of battle 
as revenge against Charlie Hebdo and 
France’s coalition against the Islamic State 
in Syria and Iraq (The Economist, 
November 21, 2015). The IS leaders 
continued to assure the importance of 
attacks against governments and people 
who are against the interests of IS all over 
the world.  
 State and civil society in Southeast 
Asia have to strengthen their partnership 
and cooperation to fight against terrorism 
and prevent violent attacks by IS, JN and 
other individuals and groups 
sympathizing them.  Local insurgent and 
violent radical groups in Southeast Asia 
such as Santoso’s Mujahidin of Eastern 
Mujahidin and Abu Sayyaf Group have 
directly threatened the government of 
Indonesia and the Philippines respectively 
of their support to the interests of IS. 
Indonesian counter-terrorism agency 
including Detachment 88 has raised the 
importance of open coordination among 
government in Southeast Asia and 
Australia to detect the flows of funds and 
people from the regions to Syria and Iraq.   
It includes prevention of cyber terrorism 
coordinated by global terrorist networks. 
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